Workshop
06.08.2014
The team of the ThinkAct project hosts an international workshop on Grounded Cognition that will take place on 7 and 8 November 2014 at Schloss Mickeln, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf.
Details: Zum Workshop
Sensorimotor Representations and Concepts / A Two-day
Workshop / Heinrich Heine Universität, Düsseldorf - Germany
19.-20.10.2012
Traditionally, cognitive scientists argued for a view of the mind in which perception, cognition and action were seen as distinct (classical sandwich). Recently, this view of the human mind has been questioned and a call for renegotiation of the relations between input, central processing and output systems of the mind has been put forth. In particular, proponents of "embodiment" argue that the human body plays a crucial role in cognition, while proponents of "grounded cognition" argue that cognition is ultimately analyzable into sensorimotor representations. The focus of this two-day workshop will be on theoretical questions related to the "grounding cognition thesis" and the implications stemming from the claim that sensorimotor representations play a crucial role in cognition. An attempt will be made to address, amongst others, the following issues:
- Are sensorimotor representations, and therefore our abilities to perceive and to move, necessary conditions for cognition?
- Are sensorimotor representations sufficient for cognition, or a further, possibly amodal code is required?
- Does conceptual thought always have a sensorimotor counterpart? Do sensorimotor representations play the role of a mere starting point for cognition, after which the latter becomes independent?
- Do impairments in sensorimotor abilities entail impairments in cognitive abilities? If so, does the reverse relation hold?
- Does cognition influence sensorimotor perception, (top-down effects on perception)?
List of Contributors:
Wolfgang Prinz, Pierre Jacob, Corrado Sinigaglia, Dan Weisskopf, Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Jennifer Cook, Byron Kaldis, Gottfried Vosgerau
Perceiving Through Moving? – An Empirical and
Conceptual Critique of Enactivism. KogWis 2012, Bamberg.
3.10.2012
According to Noë’s enactive theory of sensorimotor contingencies (Noë 2004; O’Regan & Noë 2001) sensorimotor processes are constitutive for perception. An obvious problem here is that the sensorimotor basis is seen just as a constitution condition, but not as an acquisition condition of perceptual abilities. This critique is based on conceptual considerations of and empirical evidence for a theory focusing on the interdependencies of motor control and action-related cognitive processes like perceiving an action.
GK Best Paper Award of the German Society for
Cognitive Science (GK)
September 2012
Kognitionswissenschaft]: 3rd prize was awarded to Arne M. Weber & Gottfried Vosgerau (2012): Grounding action representations. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1).
The arche of Cognition – Grounding Representations
in Action. GAP 8, Konstanz.
19.09.2012
The term “embodied cognition” is currently hotly debated amongst philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. Unfortunately, this term does not refer to a unified theory or a unitary research perspective. Questions like, ‘what does “embodiment” or “to be embodied” mean?’ are still to be answered in detail, and the possibility of operationalizing this concept in empirical research – as well as its explanatory advantage for theoretical progress – remain unclear. To achieve some progress in this regard, we clarify theoretical presuppositions of a certain understanding of “embodied” cognition, namely “grounded” cognition.
Is Cognition Grounded in Action? Conceptual Considerations
and Empirical Evidence
23.05.2011
This talk appraises the specific thesis of "grounded action cognition" and examines how to formulate an adequate theory concerning constitutive factors for both motor control and action concepts at the same time. Furthermore we ask whether there is a direct connection between the domains of motor control, action perception and action concepts which consists in a common ground. To elaborate a far-reaching theory of "grounded action cognition" we present general methodological considerations and empirical evidence.
Thinking and Motor Control
28.08.2010
Thinking and motor control are traditionally viewed as strictly separated faculties of the mind. Recent heterogeneous theses have questioned this strict separation from various sides, often subsumed under the term "grounded cognition". This symposium aims at scrutinizing the idea of grounded cognition, thereby focusing on the relation between motor control, action perception, and action cognition (thinking about actions). The leading questions are how and to what extent action perception and action cognition are grounded in basic sensorimotor abilities, and what the implications are for (i) a description and explanation of the respective phenomena and for (ii) conceptualizing the architecture of the mind. The symposium will bring together the viewpoints of philosophy, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience to discuss theoretical considerations and experimental results.
Details: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/espp2010/download/espp2010prog.pdf
